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Cross-Border Collective Redress and Individual Participatory Rights: 
Quo Vadis? 
 
S.I. Strong*  
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last few years, large-scale litigation has become increasingly important all over the 
world, with new forms of class and collective relief being adopted in both common law and 
civil law jurisdictions.1 The European Union has been particularly active in this field, 
reversing decades of doubt about the viability and necessity of such procedures.2 Not only do 
sixteen of the twenty-seven Member States currently provide for some form of large-scale 
litigation as a matter of national law (with more states contemplating such relief),3 but 
European law provides for collective relief in a select number of subject matter areas.4  
                                                          
* DPhil (Oxon); PhD (Cantab); JD (Duke). The author, who is admitted to practice as a solicitor in 
England and Wales and as an attorney in New York and Illinois, is Associate Professor of Law at the 
University of Missouri. This article was written while the author was the Henry G. Schermers Fellow 
at the Hague Institute for the Internationalisation of Law and the Netherlands Institute for Advanced 
Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences, and the author gratefully acknowledges the 
contributions of both institutions.  
 
1 See DR Hensler, ‘The Globalization of Class Actions: An Overview’, in DR Hensler et al (eds), The 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (London: Sage Publications, 2009) 
vol 622, 7, 7-11; HM Watt, ‘The Trouble With Cross-Border Collective Redress:  Issues and 
Difficulties’, in D Fairgrieve & E Lein (eds), Extraterritoriality and Collective Redress 119, 119-20 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
2 See D Fairgrieve and G Howells, ‘Collective Redress Procedures – European Debates’ (2009) 58 
Int’l and Comp L Q 379, 383-409. 
3 See Directorate General for Internal Policies, Overview of Existing Collective Redress Schemes in 
EU Member States, IP/A/IMCO/NT/2011-16, 5 (July 2011). One of the more well-known recent 
developments relates to a pan-European settlement under the Dutch Act on Collective Settlements of 
2005 (WCAM). See Scor Holding (Switzerland) AG v Liechtensteinische Landesbank AG, 
Amsterdam Court of Appeal, 17 Jan 2012 (often referring to the settlement itself as SCOR Holding 
(Switzerland) AG/Zurich Fin Serv Ltd Stichting Converium Sec Compensation Found/Vereniging 
VEBNCVB)), informal English version available at 
http://www.converiumsettlement.com/images/stories/documents/Decision%2017%20January%20201
2.pdf; see also Scor Holding (Switzerland) AG v Liechtensteinische Landesbank AG, Amsterdam 
Court of Appeal, 12 Nov 2010 (interim decision), informal English version available at 
http://www.converiumsettlement.com/images/stories/documents/Judgment%2012%20November%20
2010.pdf. 
4 See European Parliament, Resolution of 2 February 2012 on ‘Towards a Coherent European 
Approach to Collective Redress’, P7_TA(2012)0021, Recitals 10-14 [hereinafter Resolution]; see also 
B Hess, ‘A Coherent Approach to European Collective Redress’, in Fairgrieve & Lein (n 1) 107, 107-
18; SI Strong, ‘Cross-Border Collective Redress in the European Union: Constitutional Rights in the 
Face of the Brussels I Regulation’ (2013) 45 Arizona State L J 233 (listing all relevant legislation). 
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While currently existing legislation provides important protections to persons 
suffering from large-scale legal injuries, concerns arose within the European Union that the 
right to collective relief had become too fragmented and difficult to understand, particularly 
in cases involving parties from different jurisdictions.5  These concerns led the European 
Commission to undertake a public consultation in February 2011 to establish whether it was 
necessary, desirable and legally possible to create a coherent European approach to cross-
border collective redress.6 As a result of the consultation process and an own-initiative report, 
the European Parliament adopted a resolution in February 2012 (Resolution) calling for 
European and national authorities to work towards creating such a mechanism.7 In June 2013, 
the European Commission promulgated two instruments – a communication to the European 
Parliament and a draft recommendation concerning collective redress – that are broadly 
analogous to the Resolution in content, principle and policy, although the Commission does 
not currently contemplate the creation of a single European-wide procedure to address issues 
relating to collective redress, preferring instead to put the onus on individual Member States 
to devise appropriate mechanisms and then reassess the situation in four years’ time.8 
Although these developments can be viewed as a step forward in the area of collective 
redress, the current situation is far from perfect. Some of the biggest problems arise when 
                                                          
5 See Watt (n 1) 121, 125 (noting importance of collective redress as a matter of private international 
law); see also SI Strong, ‘Regulatory Litigation in the European Union: Does the U.S. Class Action 
Have a New Analogue?’ (2012) 88 Notre Dame L Rev 899 (discussing global class and collective 
relief as a form of transnational regulatory litigation). 
6 See European Commission (EC), Public Consultation: Towards a Coherent European Approach to 
Collective Redress, SEC(2011) 173, 4 February 2011 [hereinafter Public Consultation].  
7 See Resolution (n 4). The two areas that generated the most attention in the Resolution involved 
consumer and competition law (antitrust) claims.  See Resolution (n 4) ¶¶6, 17, 21, 28 (regarding 
competition law claims); see also ibid ¶¶4, 11, 14-17, 22-23 (regarding consumer law claims).  
8 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘Towards a European Horizontal 
Framework for Collective Redress’, ¶¶2.3, 3, 3.7, 4, COM(2013) 401/2 [hereinafter Commission 
Communication]; Draft Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for 
injunctive and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning 
violations of rights granted under Union Law, Recital 26, C(2013) 3539/3 [hereinafter Draft 
Recommendation]. Because the European Commission adopted thse instruments just as this article 
was going to press, it is impossible to discuss their contents in detail.   
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collective relief is placed into the context of the Brussels I Regulation in either its current or 
forthcoming state,9 a move that is specifically contemplated by both the European Parliament 
and the European Commission.10  Although commentators have addressed some of these 
issues,11 one question that has been entirely ignored involves the theoretical and practical 
ramifications of the exercise of the individual right not to participate in a collective suit, 
either by refusing to opt in or by choosing to opt out of that action.12  This right is at the heart 
of all forms of class and collective relief and is protected as a matter of constitutional law in 
numerous jurisdictions both inside and outside of Europe.13  However, very little analysis 
exists regarding the nature of the right or its exercise in the cross-border context.  Although 
numerous commentators have considered global class actions, those inquiries (1) begin from 
                                                          
9 See Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, [2001] OJ L12/1 [hereinafter Brussels I 
Regulation]. Long-anticipated revisions to the Brussels I Regulation were formally approved by the 
Council of the European Union in late 2012 and will go into effect on 10 January 2015. See 
Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 
on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
(recast), [2012] OJ L351/1 [hereinafter Brussels I Recast]. However, none of the revisions affect the 
current analysis. 
10 See Resolution (n 4) ¶27 (noting that relief should be provided ‘in accordance with the general rules 
of private international law laid down in the Brussels I, Rome I and Rome II regulations’); 
Commission Communication (n 9) ¶3.7 (same).  
11 Most analyses of collective redress and the Brussels I Resolution focuses on the propriety of opt-out 
relief, although the scope of inquiry has expanded somewhat in the last year.  See L Carballo Piñeiro, 
‘Collective Redress in the Proposal for a Brussels I bis Regulation: A Coherent Approach?’ (2012) 2 
Zeitschrift für Europäisches Unternehmens- und Verbraucherrecht – J Eur Consumer & Market L 81; 
M Danov, ‘The Brussels I Regulation: Cross-Border Collective Redress Proceedings and Judgments’ 
(2010) 5 JPIL 359, 360; D Fairgrieve, ‘The Impact of the Brussels I Enforcement and Recognition 
Rules on Collective Actions’, in Fairgrieve & Lein (n 1), 171, 171-89; B Hess, ‘Cross-border 
Collective Litigation and the Regulation Brussels I’ (2010) 2 Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und 
Verfahrensrechts (IPRax) 116, 120; J Kuipers, ‘Schemes of Arrangement and Voluntary Collective 
Redress: A Gap in the Brussels I Regulation’ (2012) 8 JPIL 225, 225-49; E Lein, ‘Cross-Border 
Collective Redress and Jurisdiction Under Brussels I:  A Mismatch’, in Fairgrieve & Lein (n 1), 129, 
129-42; H Muir Watt, ‘Brussels I and Aggregate Litigation’ (2010) 2 Praxis des Internationalen 
Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax) 111, 115.   
12 Only one commentator deals with matters that are even tangentially related.  See JN Stefanelli, 
‘Parallel Litigation and Cross-Border Collective Actions Under the Brussels I Framework:  Lessons 
From Abroad’, in Fairgrieve & Lein (n 1), 143, 143-70. 
13 See Danov (n 11) 360; Hess (n 11) 120; Watt (n 11) 115. 
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a position of US rather than European law and (2) do not unbundle the various constituent 
elements contained within the individual rights of participation.14   
This article therefore fills a critical gap in the commentary by undertaking a rights-
based analysis of the various issues that arise in cases involving large-scale international 
litigation, focusing in particular on the Brussels I Regulation and what may be called 
‘individual participatory rights’.  In so doing, the discussion considers the nature and scope of 
individual participatory rights in collective litigation as well the ways in which these rights 
should be weighed and considered. Although the analysis is set in the context of European 
procedural law, this discussion is of equal relevance to parties outside the European Union, 
either because they will face similar issues in their own legal systems (since individual 
participatory rights are relevant to all sorts of class and collective actions) or because they 
will become involved in European collective actions by virtue of the extraterritorial reach of 
the Brussels I Regulation.15 This article also contains several normative suggestions on how 
                                                          
14 See infra n 36 and accompanying text. 
15 The Brussels I Regulation has affected parties domiciled outside the European Union in the past. 
See Owusu v Jackson, Case C-281/02, [2005] Eur Ct Rep I-1381 (ECJ), [2005] QB 801; Ferrexpo AG 
v Gilson Investments Ltd [2012] EWHC 721, ¶¶131-55 (Comm); P De Verneuil Smith et al, 
‘Reflections on Owusu: The Radical Decision in Ferrexpo’ (2012) 8 JPIL 389, 389-407; SI Strong, 
‘Backyard Advantage:  New Rules Mean That U.S. Companies May be Forced to Litigate Across the 
Pond’ (May 23, 2005) 28 Legal Times 43. However, the recast version of the Brussels I Regulation 
contemplates other instances in which the Regulation can affect persons domiciled outside the 
European Union.  See Brussels I Recast (n 9).  For example: 
 
The recast regulation will provide that no national rules of jurisdiction may be 
applied any longer by member states in relation to consumers and employees 
domiciled outside the EU. Such uniform rules of jurisdiction will also apply in 
relation to parties domiciled outside the EU in situations where the courts of a 
member state have exclusive jurisdiction under the recast regulation or where 
such courts have had jurisdiction conferred on them by an agreement between the 
parties. 
 
Another important change will be a rule on international lis pendens which will 
allow the courts of a member state, on a discretionary basis, to stay the 
proceedings and eventually dismiss the proceedings in situations where a court of 
a third state has already been seized either of proceedings between the same 




policymakers in the European Union should consider and construct future legislation in this 
field.16 
Some questions may arise as to whether it is worthwhile to analyse issues relating to 
collective redress under the current version of the Brussels I Regulation, given the recent 
adoption of the Brussels I Recast. However, none of the amendments reflected in the Recast 
affect this analysis.   
 
B. INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPATORY RIGHTS IN COLLECTIVE  
 LITIGATION 
Before discussing specific issues arising under the Brussels I Regulation, it is necessary to 
describe the nature of the rights in question. Individual participatory rights have long been 
recognized as a matter of national, international and European law, although the placement of 
those rights within the context of large-scale litigation is relatively new.17 Particular problems 
arise when a claimant exercises his or her right not to participate in a collective suit 
proceeding in one jurisdiction but instead seeks to bring a secondary suit arising out of the 
same facts in another location. The assertion of this secondary suit, which can be individual 
or collective in nature, brings claimants’ and defendants’ individual rights into sharp tension, 
creating significant difficulties for courts.  
 
1. Defining Individual Participatory Rights in Collective Litigation  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Press Release, The Council of the European Union, Recast of the Brussels I regulation:  towards 
easier and faster circulation of judgments in civil and commercial matters within the EU (6 December 
2012), 16599/12, PRESSE 483.   
16 Because the Resolution constitutes the first of several necessary steps in the development of a 
coherent European plan for cross-border collective redress, there is still time for European and 
national authorities to make any necessary adjustments to the procedures proposed by the European 
Parliament. See Resolution (n 4) ¶29 (noting any new proposals will be developed pursuant to the 
ordinary legislative procedure); see also Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, [2010] OJ C83/01, art 294 (outlining the ordinary legislative procedure, also known 
as the co-decision procedure). Indeed, the European Commission expects to revisit this issue in four 
years’ time. See Commission Communication (n 9) ¶4; Draft Recommendation (n 9) Recital 26.  
17 See Carballo Piñeiro (n 11) 82; Hess (n 11) 116; Watt (n 11) 111. 
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(a) General adjudicatory rights 
Although the phrase ‘individual participatory rights’ is not found in any constitutional 
document, the underlying concept is reflected in several different principles that are protected 
as a matter of national and European law.18 The precise nature of these rights is still 
somewhat unclear, since theoretical analysis of individual participatory rights is in its nascent 
stages. However, US constitutional scholar Owen Fiss has defined the ‘right of participation’ 
as constituting ‘the notion that every person is entitled to a day in court and that no one can 
have his or her rights determined by a court without having participated in the proceeding’.19 
When translated into European terms, this right would appear to fall within the idea of access 
to justice. Indeed:  
[a]lthough it has become an over-used expression, the term ‘access to justice’ 
is a good one to refer to this bundle of rights. Access to justice rights enable 
people (a) to obtain help and advice about possible litigation; (b) to initiate 
proceedings; (c) to have a full and proper hearing of their case; and (d) to be 
granted an effectual remedial order by the court.20 
 
                                                          
18 See A Le Sueur, ‘Access to Justice Rights in the United Kingdom’ (2000) 5 Eur HR L Rev 457, 
458. Some Europeans may not view these rights as constitutional in nature, since individual 
participatory rights are a species of procedural rights, and European procedural law has traditionally 
been considered ‘sub-constitutional’. R Michaels, ‘Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction’ (2006) 27 
Michigan J Int’l L 1003, 1009. However, an increasing number of European courts and commentators 
are viewing procedural issues from a constitutional or fundamental human rights perspective, which 
may heighten debates about individual participatory rights in collective litigation. See B Hess, 
‘Procedural Harmonisation in a European Context’ in XE Kramer and CH van Rhee (eds), Civil 
Litigation in a Globalizing World (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2012) 159, 169-72; Le Sueur (n 18) 
475; see also M Cappelletti, ‘Fundamental Guarantees of the Parties in Civil Litigation: Comparative 
Constitutional, International and Social Trends’ (1973) 25 Stanford L Rev 651. But see JJ Fawcett, 
‘The Impact of Article 6(1) of the ECHR on Private International Law’ (2007) 56 Int’l and Comp L Q 
1, 33 (noting a trend among courts to downplay the connection between constitutional and 
fundamental rights on the one hand and the Brussels I Regulation on the other). 
19 OM Fiss, ‘The Allure of Individualism’ (1993) 78 Iowa L Rev 965, 967. However, Fiss would note 
that ‘the legal system does not guarantee that every person will have a day in court, but only that the 
interest of each person will be represented in court’. OM Fiss, ‘The Political Theory of the Class 
Action’ (1996) 53 Washington and Lee L Rev 21, 25. 
20 See Le Sueur (n 18) 457. 
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Individual participatory rights are not held only by claimants. Defendants also have 
certain rights in the adjudicative process.21 One key defence right involves the concept of 
preclusion, or the right to rely on a previously and properly adjudicated judgment in some 
fashion. This idea is subsumed within the notion of res judicata, which Peter Barnett 
describes as: 
encapsulat[ing] a principle inherent in all judicial systems, namely that an 
earlier adjudication is conclusive in a second suit involving the same subject-
matter and same legal bases. As such, the doctrine reflects two fundamental 
maxims of justice: that no person should be proceeded against twice in respect 
of the same subject-matter, and that it is in the interest of the state that 
repetitious and wasteful re-litigation be avoided.22  
 
While the principles of access to justice and res judicata are normally associated with 
claimants and defendants respectively, there is no legal distinction limiting who may rely on 
which legal concept. The idea that both sets of parties hold both sets of rights is important to 
remember in the context of collective redress, since the ‘normal’ procedural posture found in 
bilateral disputes can sometimes be turned upside-down in cases involving large groups of 
claimants.23 Thus, for example, jurisdictional rules relating to the court’s extraterritorial reach 
may be applied to claimants involved in a cross-border collective action, even though those 
principles are usually applied to defendants in a bilateral suit.24  
Parties seeking to establish an individual participatory right can base their claims on 
national, international or European law. For example, Article 6 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR) protects the ‘implied right of “access to a court” for disputes about 
                                                          
21 See A Layton, ‘Collective Redress: Policy Objectives and Practical Problems’, in Fairgrieve & Lein 
(n 1), 93, 94; see also Brussels I Regulation (n 9) ¶29 (noting the need to respect ‘the rights of the 
defense’). 
22 P Barnett, ‘The Prevention of Abusive Cross-Border Re-Litigation’ (2002) 51 Int’l and 
Comp L Q 943, 944 (citations omitted). 
23 See GA Bermann, ‘US Class Actions and the “Global” Class’ (2009) 19 Kansas J L & Pub Pol’y 
91, 97. 
24 See ibid. 
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any “civil right or obligation”’,25 while Article 13 provides for ‘effective remedies’ for 
violations of rights under the ECHR.26  
Similar protections exist as a matter of EU law based on the ‘general principle of law 
establishing . . . the notion of “effective protection” of Community law rights by national 
courts and tribunals’.27 An increasingly popular provision is Article 47 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Charter), which states in relevant part that: 
[e]veryone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are 
violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance 
with the conditions laid down in this Article. Everyone is entitled to a fair and 
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial 
tribunal previously established by law.28  
 
Although the Charter does not specifically identify what an ‘effective remedy’ is, European 
and other authorities have suggested that there are times when collective redress may be the 
only means by which an effective remedy can be provided.29  
Finally, parties to an inter-European collective dispute can rely on national law to 
establish various rights of access and procedural protections.30 Indeed, in some instances, 
national law will be the primary source of law regarding an individual participatory right.31  
                                                          
25 Le Sueur (n 18) 457-58; see also European Convention on Human Rights, as amended by protocols 
nos 11 and 14, art 6, effective 1 June 2010. 
26 Le Sueur (n 18) 457-58. 
27 Ibid 458. 
28 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000/C 364/1, art 47, 18 December 
2000 [hereinafter Charter]; see also P Van Cleynenbreugel, ‘Judge-Made Standards of 
National Procedure in the Post-Lisbon Constitutional Framework’ (2012) 37 Eur L Rev 90, 
94-95; Hess (n 18) 169-70; S Douglas-Scott, ‘The Charter of Fundamental Rights as a 
Constitutional Document’ (2004) 1 Eur HR L Rev 37, 46. 
29 See Resolution (n 4) ¶F; Deposit Guarantee National Bank v Roper, 445 US 326, 339 (1980) (‘The 
aggregation of individual claims in the context of a classwide suit is an evolutionary response to the 
existence of injuries unremedied by the regulatory action of government. Where it is not economically 
feasible to obtain relief within the traditional framework of a multiplicity of small individual suits for 
damages, aggrieved persons may be without any effective redress unless they may employ the class-
action device.’); Abaclat v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction 
and Admissibility dated 4 August 2011, ¶545 [hereinafter Abaclat Award]; Layton (n 21) 94. 
30 See Le Sueur (n 18) 458. 
31 See A Briggs and P Rees, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (London: Informa, 2009) ¶7.26 
(discussing principles of preclusion); Barnett (n 22) 956.  
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Although claimants and defendants each hold certain rights of participation, those 
rights can be broken down into smaller components.  Each set of rights is discussed in more 
detail in the following subsections. 
 
(b) Individual participatory rights from the claimants’ perspective 
As their name suggests, individual participatory rights protect a party’s ability to participate 
effectively in an adjudicatory proceeding. However, claimants’ individual participatory rights 
may sometimes be overlooked if individual claimants are not considered the true motivating 
force behind a particular lawsuit.32 For example, most tactical decisions about class disputes 
in the United States are made by class counsel, with very few individual claimants ever 
indicating a desire either to affect the litigation strategy or proceed individually apart from 
the class.33 Indeed, class suits in the United States are specifically designed to eliminate or at 
least drastically reduce an individual claimant’s need or desire to proceed separately from the 
collective.34 Similar issues could arise in inter-European disputes, although the incentives for 
European forms of collective redress to be driven by counsel, as opposed to claimants, are 
much lower than in the United States.35 
 Most analyses regarding claimants’ individual participatory rights has been conducted 
in the context of international (global) class actions.36 The issue typically arises during the 
                                                          
32 This notion originated in the United States.  See J Kalajdzic, ‘Self-Interest, Public Interest, and the 
Interests of the Absent Client: Legal Ethics and the Class Action Praxis’ (2011) 49 Osgoode Hall L J 
1, 8, 10, 15-19; AD Lahav, ‘Two Views of the Class Action’ (2011) 79 Fordham L Rev 1939, 1948. 
However, individual claimants are provided with a number of protections, such as the right to object 
to settlements. See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23(e)(5) (US). 
33 See TE Willging et al, Empirical Study of Class Actions in Four Federal District Courts: Final 
Report to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (Washington, D.C.: Federal Judicial Center ,1996) 
55-59, 79. 
34 See Hensler (n 1) 21; see also J Bronsteen and O Fiss, ‘The Class Action Rule’ (2003) 78 Notre 
Dame L Rev 1419, 1443.  
35 See Hensler (n 1) 22-25. 
36 See JCL Dixon, ‘The Res Judicata Effect in England of a US Class Action Settlement’ (1997) 46 
Int’l and Comp L Q 134; Fairgrieve and Howells (n 2) 379; C Hodges, ‘Collective Redress in Europe: 
The New Model’ (2010) 29 Civil Just Q 370; S Issacharoff and GP Miller, ‘Will Aggregate Litigation 
10 
 
class certification stage, when the defendant objects to the presence of claimants from outside 
the jurisdiction on the grounds that other nations do not permit collective relief on an opt-out 
basis and that those jurisdictions will allow their nationals to bring independent claims 
against the defendant notwithstanding the class judgment.37 Although the debate does invoke 
concerns about res judicata,38 the matter may perhaps be more accurately framed as 
involving claimants’ individual participatory rights. 
 The content of these rights is somewhat ambiguous. Traditionally, individual 
participatory rights have been framed as reflecting the claimant’s ability to choose whether, 
when and where to bring a legal claim.39 However, there may be a previously unidentified 
fourth element that would protect a claimant’s ability to choose the manner in which the suit 
is asserted. This fourth element is specifically contemplated in the Resolution in language 
stating that ‘individual victims should remain free not to pursue the opt-in collective action 
but instead to seek redress individually’.40   However, some questions remain regarding the 
scope and exercise of each of the constituent elements, including whether individuals retain 
only the right to proceed individually or whether they may join together to form a collective 
different than the one that they chose not to join initially, as discussed further below.41 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Come to Europe?’ (2009) 52 Vanderbilt L Rev 179; TJ Monestier, ‘Transnational Class Actions and 
the Illusory Search for Res Judicata’ (2011) 86 Tulane L Rev 1; R Mulheron, ‘The Case for an Opt-
Out Class Action for European Member States: A Legal and Empirical Analysis’ (2009) 15 Columbia 
J Eur L 409; R Mulheron, ‘Recent Milestones in Class Action Reform in England: A Critique and A 
Proposal’ (2011) 127 L Q Rev 288; RA Nagareda, ‘Aggregate Litigation Across the Atlantic and the 
Future of American Exceptionalism’ (2009) 62 Vanderbilt L Rev 1; TL Russell, ‘Exporting Class 
Actions to the European Union’ (2010) 28 Boston U Int’l L J 141; G Wagner, ‘Collective Redress – 
Categories of Loss and Legislative Options’ (2011) 127 L Q Rev 55. 
37 See In re Vivendi Universal, No 02 Civ 5571, 2009 WL 855799, at *3 (SDNY 31 March 2009) 
(noting the defendant argued that opt-out classes were unconstitutional in France); Monestier (n 36) 
38-39 (discussing French, German and Swedish law). The issue arises in Canada as well as the United 
States. See R Mulheron, The Class Action in Common Law Legal Systems: A Comparative 
Perspective 34 (Hart Publishing 2004). 
38 See Phillips Petroleum v Shutts, 472 US 797, 804-05 (1985). 
39 See Monestier (n 36) 38-39. 
40 Resolution (n 4) ¶27; see also ibid ¶20; see also Commission Communication (n 9) ¶22. The 
concept appears to be implicitly protected in other jurisdictions. 
41 See Commission Communication (n 9) ¶22; see also infra nn 70-147 and accompanying text.  




(c) Individual participatory rights from the defendants’ perspective 
Claimants are not the only parties to lay claim to individual participatory rights in collective 
litigation. Defendants have their own set of rights to consider.42 Although the focus is often 
on issues relating to preclusion, defendants also hold an interest in mounting an 
individualized defence against every claim that is brought. In some jurisdictions, this 
principle is protected as a matter of public policy, while in other instances it exists as a 
fundamental constitutional right.43 
Collective proceedings are often characterized as infringing, albeit in a permissible 
manner, on defendants’ individual participatory rights, based on utilitarian concerns about 
efficiency and preservation of judicial resources.44 Under this reading, a defendant’s 
individual participatory rights can be and in fact are trumped by state and other interests.45 
However, this is not the only way to frame this issue. Indeed, it is also possible to conclude 
that class or collective proceedings are permitted precisely because they do not infringe on 
defendants’ individualized defence rights. 
This latter interpretation is based on the requirement – explicit in some jurisdictions 
and implicit in others – that any claims must be identical or functionally identical if they are 
to be brought collectively.46 In these types of cases, a defendant does not need to assert any 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
in order to proceed individually or collectively elsewhere. This question would likely be decided as a 
matter of national law in at least the first instance, although the cross-border element could complicate 
matters. See A Stadler, ‘Conflicts of Laws in Multinational Collective Actions – A Judicial 
Nightmare?’ in Fairgrieve & Lein (n 1), 191, 191-214. 
42 See Phillips Petroleum, 472 US at 805; Layton (n 21) 94. 
43 See RH Dreyfuss, ‘Class Action Judgment Enforcement in Italy: Procedural “Due Process” 
Requirements’ (2002) 10 Tulane J Int’l and Comp L 5, 9-10, 19, 25-26; M Taruffo, ‘Some Remarks 
on Group Litigation in Comparative Perspective’ (2001) 11 Duke J Comp and Int’l L 405, 415; see 
also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc v Dukes, 131 SCt 2541, 2561 (2011).  
44 See Layton (n 21) 94; Le Sueur (n 18) 473.  
45 See Le Sueur (n 18) 473. 
46 See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23(a)(2), 23(b)(3) (US) (noting need for ‘questions of 
law or fact common to the class’); Catherine Kessedjian, ‘The ILA Rio Resolution on Transnational 
Group Actions’, in Fairgrieve & Lein (n 1) 223, 237-28; Stefanelli (n 12) 150-51. This requirement is 
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individualized defences. Instead, a single standard defence is sufficient to address all 
outstanding issues.  
 This principle has been adopted in several different contexts. For example, US courts 
routinely reject certification of class actions in cases where there is insufficient 
‘commonality’.47 Lack of commonality can arise in two ways: either the claims themselves 
are not similar enough to warrant class proceedings or the defendant has raised certain 
defences that are applicable to some, but not all, members of the purported class.48 Either 
allegation can defeat the creation of a class. 
Sometimes the members of the purported class are similarly situated in some regards 
but not others. US courts address this situation through the creation of sub-classes or through 
bifurcation of the proceedings so as to allow the common issues to be heard collectively 
before separating the cases for individual resolution on the remaining matters. In either 
scenario, the court is protecting the defendant’s right to address each claimant’s individual 
case or to present an individualized defence. Therefore, defendants’ individual participatory 
rights may be characterized, at least in the first instance, as the right to assert an 
individualized defence to the extent such individualized defences are necessary.49 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
framed as the need for ‘commonality’ in US jurisprudence, although defendants in US class actions 
‘have not traditionally challenged commonality because they have viewed those challenges as losing 
battles’. AJ Trask, Wal-Mart v Dukes: Class Actions and Legal Strategy, 2011 Cato Sup Ct Rev 319, 
354. However, defendants are expected to assert (and are in fact asserting) such challenges more often 
as a result of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc v Dukes. See 131 SCt 2541 (2011); Trask (n 46) 354.  
47 See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23(a)(2) (US); Mulheron (n 36) 165-217.  
48 See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule (a)(2), 23(b)(3) (US); Comments of the European 
Competition Lawyers’ Forum on the European Commission Staff Working Document, ‘Towards a 
Coherent Approach to Collective Redress’ (April 2011) ¶6; Mulheron (n 36) 165-217; S Peyer, 
‘Private Antitrust Litigation in Germany From 2005 to 2007: Empirical Evidence’, (2012) 8 J Compet 
L & Econ 331, 335-36. 
49 See E Meriwether, ‘The “Hazards” of Dukes: Antitrust Class Action Plaintiffs Need Not Fear the 
Supreme Court’s Decision’ (Fall 2011) 26 Antitrust 18, 18; see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc v Dukes, 
131 SCt 2541 (2011); JC Massaro, ‘The Emerging Federal Class Action Brand’ (2011) 59 Cleveland 
State L Rev 645, 667; J Resnik, ‘Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v Concepcion, Walmart 
v Dukes, and Turner v Rogers’ (2011) 125 Harv L Rev 78, 150-51. 
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 Similar conclusions have been reached in the international investment context. The 
issue arose recently in Abaclat v. Argentine Republic, the first large-scale legal claim to be 
brought under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and 
Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention).50 The dispute involved 60,000 Italian 
bondholders who made a joint claim against Argentina following Argentina’s default on 
approximately $100 billion worth of sovereign debt, a move that rendered the bondholders’ 
investments worthless.51  
 Although mass claims had never before been heard in the context of an ICSID 
arbitration, the Abaclat tribunal held that such proceedings were proper because all 60,000 
claims were essentially the same. In considering the matter, the tribunal held that forcing 
Argentina ‘to face 60,000 proceedings would be a much bigger challenge to Argentina’s 
effective defence rights than a mere limitation of its right to individual treatment of 
homogenous claims in the present proceedings’.52 While the dissenting panellist took issue 
with a number of aspects of the majority decision – not the least of which was whether the 
claims at issue in the dispute were indeed homogenous – there was no real dispute from a 
rights perspective about the general propriety of allowing identical claims to be brought 
jointly.53 
 
2. Weighing the Various Rights 
Before considering how individual participatory rights play out in the European legal context, 
it is important to discuss briefly how courts might balance competing rights and interests in 
                                                          
50 See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other 
States (ICSID Convention), 18 March 1965, 575 UNTS 159. 
51 See Abaclat Award (n 29) ¶58; see also Abaclat v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/07/5, 
Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Dissenting Opinion dated 28 October 2011 [hereinafter 
Abaclat Dissent].  
52 Abaclat Award (n 29) ¶545; see also SI Strong, ‘Mass Procedures as a Form of “Regulatory 
Arbitration” – Abaclat v. Argentine Republic and the International Investment Regime’ (2013) 38 J 
Corporation L 259. 
53 See Abaclat Dissent (n 51) ¶¶142-44.  
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this area of law. Notably, designating a particular principle as a ‘right’ allows it to trump or 
override certain other types of laws or practices.54 However, there are times when two rights 
come into conflict, making it necessary to apply some sort of balancing analysis.  
 Some balancing tests exist within the law itself. Thus, for example, Article 52(1) of 
the Charter states that: 
[a]ny limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this 
Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights 
and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be 
made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general 
interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms 
of others. 
 
This provision requires a relevant right to exist at national law before the balancing 
test applies.55 However, once it is established (as here) that such a right exists, then Article 
52(1) usefully identifies the various factors that are relevant to a balancing analysis under 
European law. 
However, simply identifying the relevant criteria is not enough. Judges also need to 
evaluate the relative weights of each of the individual rights and interests. 
This second step may prove particularly challenging for courts faced with claims 
involving individual participatory rights because these rights are inextricably connected to a 
particular remedy (i.e., collective redress).56 Owen Fiss has discussed the ‘complicated 
relationship between rights and remedies’ at some length, noting the common 
(mis)perception that:  
[r]ights are ‘the true meaning of . . . constitutional values, such as equality, 
liberty, due process, or property. . . .’ Remedies are designed to ‘actualize’ the 
constitutional value and incorporate considerations that are not principled 
corollaries of the constitutional value but rather are ‘subsidiary’, ‘strategic’, 
and ‘instrumental’. Thus, remedies are ‘subordinate’ to rights. They are not 
only subordinate, but also metaphysically segregated, for ‘rights operate in the 
                                                          
54 See Le Sueur (n 18) 469-74. 
55 See McB v E, Case C-400/10PPU, [2011] Fam 364, ¶52 (ECJ, 5 October 2010); ZZ v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department [2011] EWCA Civ 440 ¶16. 
56 See MJ Hall and DC Weiss, ‘Human Rights and Remedial Equilibration: Equilibrating Socio-
Economic Rights’ (2011) 36 Brooklyn Int’l L Rev 453, 501. 
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world of abstraction, remedies in the world of practical reality’. Judges have 
unique legitimacy and competence to discover the ‘true meaning of our 
constitutional values’ because of their independence and objectivity. When 
they attempt to ‘actualize’ these constitutional values by constructing 
remedies, however, judges move from the ‘realm of abstraction’, where they 
have a ‘special claim of competency’, to the ‘world of practical reality’, where 
they do not. Although Fiss wants to keep judges in the business of remedies, 
he worries that judges will distort the true meaning of constitutional rights by 
tailoring them to fit what effective remedies are available. Fiss fears that the 
purity of rights will be corrupted by the practicalities of remedies.57 
 
Although Fiss writes in the context of US constitutional law, the concept of remedies 
being subordinate to rights is also seen in the national laws of some European Member 
States.58 While some legal instruments (such as the Charter) attempt to overcome this 
subordination of procedural issues by making ‘an effective remedy’ a right in and of itself,59 
the tension between rights and remedies may make balancing tests particularly difficult to 
apply in the context of collective redress.  
Theorists have proposed a number of approaches to rights balancing. For example, 
some methods promote the maximization of rights,60 while others focus on the protection of 
the ‘minimum core’ of a particular constitutional concern.61 Some courts and commentators 
believe that procedural rights may require or permit a slightly different analysis due to the 
                                                          
57 DJ Levinson, ‘Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration’ (1999) 99 Columbia L Rev 857, 
871 (citations omitted) (discussing O Fiss, ‘Foreword: The Forms of Justice’ (1979) 93 Harv L Rev 
1); see also ibid 857-58. 
58 See A Lester, ‘The Human Rights Act – Five Years On’ (2004) 3 Eur HR L Rev 258, 260. 
59 See Charter (n 28) art 47. A similar technique appears to exist in international investment law. See 
C McLachlan et al, International Investment Arbitration: Substantive Principles 45 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008) (stating that ‘[t]he protection offered to investors by the dispute resolution 
provisions of treaties is sufficiently important to rise to the level of a substantive principle in its own 
right’). 
60 See Hall and Weiss (n 56) 489-90. 
61 See ibid 469 (‘The concept of the “minimum core” has historical connections to constitutional 
principles. It inherits its structure from German basic law, which protects the essential content of a 
constitutional right from potential limitation. Many constitutions include structural references to a 
core, pure, or essential component of a right that cannot be infringed or derogated, either as part of the 
articulated constitutional right itself or via a constitutional limitation clause.’ (citations omitted)).  
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presence of certain state interests and, perhaps, a diminished concern for rights that involve 
‘mere’ remedies.62 Thus, Andrew Le Sueur has written that: 
[t]hough the rhetoric of ‘fundamental rights’ is used to describe rights relating 
to access to justice, in practice the courts . . . have recognised that the rights 
are limited by utilitarian factors. Unlike many other fundamental rights (think 
of freedom of expression), rights about access to justice require public 
expenditure: they assume a functioning legal system with courts and (to an 
extent) provision of public funds to assist people finance [sic] litigation. In the 
light of this stark fact, no one can think of access to justice rights as absolute.63 
 
One of the issues that arises frequently in rights discourse is whether it is possible to 
balance rights which are said to be inherently incommensurable.64 This is particularly 
difficult when rights exist in opposition to one another, i.e., when what is good for one party 
is bad for the other.65 Furthermore, ‘the metaphor of balancing “says nothing about how 
various interests are to be weighted, and this silence tends to conceal the impossibility of 
measuring incommensurable values”’.66  
Just because certain factors are incommensurable does not mean that a balancing 
analysis cannot take place. However, in conducting this kind of analysis, it is often, as Cass 
Sunstein says, ‘desirable to have a highly disaggregated picture of the consequences of legal 
rules, a picture that enables the judge to see the various goods at stake’.67 Furthermore: 
[j]ust as it is possible to compare apples and oranges relative to a given 
covering value (vitamin content, for instance), it is also possible to compare 
and balance constitutional rights relative to a given covering value: their 
degrees of satisfaction and non-satisfaction. The fact that these rights may be 
                                                          
62 The question of whether the ability to proceed as a class or collective should be considered a right 
or a remedy can be complicated. See Strong (n 5).    
63 Le Sueur (n 18) 473.  
64 See MW McConnell and RA Posner, ‘An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom’ 
(1989) 56 U Chicago L Rev 1, 46, 51; CR Sunstein, ‘Incompletely Theorized Agreements’ (1995) 108 
Harv L Rev 1733, 1748; R West, ‘Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism’ (1990) 88 
Michigan L Rev 641, 697.  
65 See VA da Silva, ‘Comparing the Incommensurable: Constitutional Principles, Balancing and 
Rational Decision’ (2011) 31 OJLS 273, 284, 299. 
66 Ibid 275 (citation omitted).  
67 CR Sunstein, Free Markets and Social Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) 99; Sunstein 
(n 65) 1735-36; see also da Silva (n 65) 301; Le Sueur (n 18) 473. 
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incommensurable in the abstract does not alter their comparability in concrete 
situations.68 
 
These suggestions provide an excellent methodology for analysis of individual 
participatory rights. Therefore, the following discussion will attempt to (1) separate out the 
various elements of individual participatory rights, (2) identify whether any of these 
constituent elements is more important than the others and whether any core elements exist; 
(3) place the rights analysis into a specific context; and (4) compare and balance ‘like to like’ 
(i.e., rights to rights) whenever possible, bringing in secondary issues, such as state interests 
in efficiency or costs, only as a secondary measure.69   
 
B. INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPATORY RIGHTS AND EUROPEAN CROSS- 
BORDER COLLECTIVE REDRESS  
Quite often, European commentary on collective redress focuses on issues relating to the 
relevant merits of opt-in versus opt-out relief, with opt-in actions being considered less 
problematic because they are less likely to infringe on individual participatory rights.70  The 
problem is that merely limiting the type of relief that is available does not necessarily provide 
adequate protection for individual participatory rights. These issues are clearly seen when 
collective redress is contemplated within the framework of the Brussels I Regulation.71   
The Brussels I Regulation was enacted to facilitate inter-European litigation in two 
different ways: first, by providing clear and predictable rules concerning which national court 
has jurisdiction over any particular matter, and second, by providing an easy and predictable 
                                                          
68 Da Silva (n 65) 301; see also WJ Aceves, ‘Predicting Chaos? Using Scenarios to Inform Theory 
and Guide Practice’ (2005) 45 Virginia J Int’l L 585, 607-09; da Silva (n 65) 286; Sunstein (n 67) 
101. 
69 See Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319, 347 (1976) (noting that ‘[i]n striking the appropriate due 
process balance the final factor to be assessed is the public interest. This includes the administrative 
burden and other societal costs that would be associated’ with fulfilling the right in question). 
70 See supra n 11 and accompanying text. 
71 However, similar problems can arise in other jurisdictions.  See R. Wasserman, ‘Dueling Class 




means of recognizing and enforcing judgments from other Member States.72 However, the 
Brussels I Regulation was not designed with large-scale collective actions in mind.73 This 
creates significant problems for individuals who want to exercise their right not to opt into a 
collective dispute and instead proceed in a separate action.  
 
1. Secondary Actions – Collective or Individual? 
Before launching into an analysis of individual participatory rights under the Brussels I 
Regulation, it is useful to consider whether people who choose not to opt into a collective suit 
only retain the right to bring an individual action or whether they remain capable of banding 
together to bring a second large-scale litigation. Those people who see all collective 
proceedings as essentially indistinguishable will likely consider it unnecessary and perhaps 
inappropriate to protect the ability to bring a secondary collective action.74 This has been the 
prevailing theory in the United States, at least in class suits that are brought in a single US 
state.75  
However, not everyone agrees that all collective actions are created equal, particularly 
in inter-European disputes where proceedings may be asserted in different Member States. 
Collective redress procedures vary considerably between individual Member States, which 
might provide the basis for arguing that a secondary collective suit is in some cases 
necessary, since parties might have rights and remedies in some national courts that are not 
                                                          
72 See Brussels I Regulation (n 9) arts 11, 17. 
73 See Danov (n 11) 364-65.  
74 Multiple class actions regarding the same facts are seen as decreasing confidence in the legal 
system and the judiciary. See V Morabito, ‘Clashing Classes Down Under – Evaluating Australia’s 
Competing Class Actions Through Empirical and Comparative Perspectives’ (2010) 27 Connecticut J 
Int’l L 245, 250-51. 
75 See Hensler (n 1) 21. However, the recent US Supreme Court decision in Shady Grove Orthopedic 
Associates, PA v Allstate Insurance Co may create tensions in this area and inspire a more rigorous 
debate about differences between state and federal procedures and about the scope of individual 
participatory rights in multijurisdictional disputes. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc, PA v Allstate 
Ins Co, 130 SCt 1431, 1442-48 (2010); AM Steinman, ‘Our Class Action Federalism: Erie and the 
Rules Enabling Act After Shady Grove’ (2011) 86 Notre Dame L Rev 1131, 1179-80. 
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available elsewhere.76 Differences could also arise as a matter of substantive law, although 
those issues could be addressed through conflict of law rules.77  
One issue that is related to the question of the nature of the right to bring a separate 
suit is whether the right to collective relief is procedural or substantive in nature. This issue 
has created a number of difficulties in multijurisdictional suits in and between the United 
States and Canada,78 and could give rise to similar problems in the European Union, 
particularly since the distinction between procedure and substance has not always been 
entirely clear-cut in European law.79  
 As courts and commentators consider the propriety of secondary collective relief, they 
must recognize that while such suits may be inefficient, they do not violate any of the parties’ 
individual participatory rights. For example, a secondary collective action not only allows 
claimants to choose whether, when and where to assert their legal rights, it also permits 
claimants to determine the manner in which their claims will be resolved. 
 Furthermore, a secondary collective suit does not infringe on the defendant’s 
individual participatory rights in any way, since defendants are still able to assert any 
individualized defences that are necessary and can seek to curtail or bar secondary collective 
suits on the grounds of non-commonality to the same extent as in the initial collective action. 
                                                          
76 See Directorate General for Internal Policies (n 3) 38 (noting European Member States have 
adopted four general types of collective redress: “group and representative actions, test case 
procedures and procedures for skimming off profits”); see also F Valguarnera, ‘Legal Tradition as an 
Obstacle: Europe’s Difficult Journey to Class Action’ (2010) 10 Global Jurist 1, 8-19. However, the 
coherent system of cross-border collective redress contemplated by the European Parliament may do 
away with some or all of these procedural distinctions in multijurisdictional actions. See Resolution (n 
4). 
77 However, some commentators see currently existing rules as inadequate to this particular task. See 
Stadler (n 41) 191-214. The Resolution contemplates a potential revamping of conflict of law rules to 
take these concerns into account.  See Resolution (n 4) ¶27. 
78 See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc, PA v Allstate Ins Co, 130 SCt 1431, 1442-48 (2010); Amchem 
Products, Inc v Windsor, 521 US 591, 613 (1997); Bisaillon v Concordia University [2006] 1 SCR 
666, 2006 SCC 19, ¶¶15, 17 (construing legislation from Quebec); Strong (n 4); SI Strong, ‘Resolving 
Mass Legal Disputes Through Class Arbitration: The United States and Canada Compared’ (2012) 37 
North Carolina J Int’l and Commercial Reg 921. 
79 See Le Sueur (n 18) 463-66. However, the Resolution expressly states that ‘access to justice by 
means of collective redress comes within the sphere of procedural law’. Resolution (n 4) ¶15. 
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The one defence right that may seem to be affected would be the right to use a collective 
judgment preclusively, but that right typically only applies between the parties to the first 
action.80 Given that the claimants in the secondary suit were not present in the first action, 
this right would not seem to be at stake, although, as shall be discussed further below, the 
definition of ‘the same parties’ is a somewhat difficult question in cases involving collective 
redress.81  
Although a rule allowing secondary collective proceedings does not appear to infringe 
on the parties’ individual participatory rights (at least in the abstract), a rule prohibiting such 
suits is more problematic, since it limits claimants’ right to pursue their claims in the manner 
that they choose (i.e., collectively). However, it is not clear whether the right to proceed 
collectively is or should be in any way protectable.82 This is an issue that is very much under 
debate in the United States83 and one that European authorities and individual Member States 
will have to consider going forward. 
 Regardless of whether the secondary action is individual or collective, there are two 
times when such an action can be brought.84 For example, a secondary action could be 
brought at the same time as the first collective suit.  Alternatively, the secondary action could 
be brought after the conclusion of the first collective suit. Each type of proceeding carries its 
own legal and tactical challenges, and will be considered separately below.85  
In considering these and related issues, it is useful to place the discussion in context, 
as suggested by Cass Sunstein.86 Therefore, the following analysis will assume that a 
                                                          
80 See Barnett (n 22) 943.  
81 See Stefanelli (n 12) 149-50; see also infra n 115 and accompanying text. 
82 See Bronsteen and Fiss (n 34) 1443; Strong (n 4) 921. 
83 The issue arises most frequently in the context of waivers of class or collective relief in arbitration.  
See SI Strong, Class, Mass and Collective Arbitration in National and International Law ¶¶3.151, 
4.85-4.121, 5.70-5.72 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
84 See Morabito (n 74) 254; Wasserman, Dueling (n 71) 464-65 (comparing sequential and 
simultaneous class actions in the US). 
85 See infra nn 90-148 and accompanying text. 
86 See supra nn 64-67 and accompanying text (suggesting rights analyses should be contextualized).  
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collective proceeding has been properly instituted in the court of Member State A, a state 
with jurisdiction over the matter. The court in Member State A is therefore the first seized of 
the collective dispute.87 However, an individual in Member State B (Person B) declines to opt 
into the suit in Member State A and instead initiates his or her own individual claim in 
Member State B, a state with jurisdiction under the Brussels I Regulation.88 While various 
other permutations could arise (a secondary collective suit in Member State B, for example, 
or an individual suit filed in Member State B prior to the collective action in Member State 
A) those analyses will be left for another day.89  
 
2. Simultaneous Actions 
The purpose of the Brussels I Regulation is to ‘minimise the possibility of concurrent 
proceedings and . . . ensure that irreconcilable judgments will not be given in two Member 
States’.90 These goals are achieved through Articles 27 and 28 of the Brussels I Regulation, 
which deal with the principle of lis pendens and related actions.91 Therefore, the first question 
                                                          
87 See Brussels I Regulation (n 9) art 30. 
88 See ibid arts 2-26; Lein (n 11) 135-37 (discussing multiple jurisdictional options). 
89 One issue not addressed herein involves the ‘torpedo’ problem, wherein a defendant files suit for 
declaratory relief in order to establish jurisdiction in a Member State that offers particularly favorable 
provisions of substantive or procedural law.  See Stefanelli (n 12) 149, 152-54.  
90 Brussels I Regulation (n 9) ¶15. 
91 Article 27 states:  
 
1. Where proceedings involving the same cause of action and between the same 
parties are brought in the courts of different Member States, any court other than the 
court first seised shall of its own motion stay its proceedings until such time as the 
jurisdiction of the court first seised is established. 
2. Where the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established, any court other than 
the court first seised shall decline jurisdiction in favour of that court. 
 
Ibid art. 27.  Article 28 states:  
 
1. Where related actions are pending in the courts of different Member States, any 
court other than the court first seised may stay its proceedings. 
2. Where these actions are pending at first instance, any court other than the court first 
seised may also, on the application of one of the parties, decline jurisdiction if the 




to arise when a party chooses to bring a secondary suit rather than opt into an ongoing 
collective action is whether that secondary litigation should be addressed under Article 27 or 
28.92 
Because the party bringing the secondary action in Member State B has consciously 
chosen not to opt into the collective suit in Member State A, it seems clear that Article 27, 
which refers to ‘proceedings involving the same cause of action and between the same 
parties’, cannot apply. Instead, Article 28, which refers to ‘related actions’, would appear the 
more appropriate means of addressing the secondary suit. Indeed, Article 28 seems tailor-
made for these kinds of situations, since it applies whenever the related actions ‘are so closely 
connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of 
irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings’.  
Under Article 28, the second court may either stay proceedings or ‘decline 
jurisdiction if the court first seised has jurisdiction over the actions in question and its law 
permits the consolidation thereof. This is a discretionary power, although courts are given no 
guidance on how best to exercise that discretion.93  Therefore, this discussion will again be 
put into a specific hypothetical context, consistent with the Sunstein methodology,94 so as to 
facilitate analysis. The best way of analyzing these matters is to distinguish between 
situations where the claims brought in the individual action in Member State B are identical 
to those asserted in the collective suit in Member State A and situations where the individual 
claims are different than those in the collective claim.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
3. For the purposes of this Article, actions are deemed to be related where they are so 
closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the 
risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings. 
 
Ibid art. 28. 
92 See Stefanelli (n 12) 148-51. 
93 See Briggs and Rees (n 31) ¶2.245; Stefanelli (n 12) 149. 
94 See supra nn 94-97 and accompanying text. 
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(a) Claimant’s claim is identical to that asserted in the collective suit 
In this first scenario, the individual claimant’s cause of action is similar, if not identical, to 
that being asserted in the collective suit, either as a matter of law, fact or underlying legal 
theory. When considered under a pure rights analysis, the best course of action appears to be 
for the court in Member State B to decline jurisdiction under Article 28(2) of the Brussels I 
Regulation, since consolidation would be proper in Member State A, given the nature of the 
claims and the collective proceeding.  
Some defendants might initially find this approach objectionable, since it results in an 
increase in the size of the group proceeding in Member State A and many defendants believe 
that they should never take any step that might increase the size of the class.95 However, that 
tactical philosophy was initially developed in the United States and was motivated in large 
part by two factors, punitive damages and widespread discovery, that are not typically present 
in European litigation.96 The absence of punitive damages means that the defendant’s 
financial exposure is limited to compensatory costs (which will likely be the same in both 
Member State A and Member State B, barring any unanticipated differences that might arise 
as a result of a conflict of laws analysis), while the European abhorrence of widespread US-
style discovery means that the defendant will not become subject to additional suits or claims 
based on information produced in the current lawsuit.97 These factors suggest that the 
defendant in an inter-European dispute should be largely indifferent as to where the 
secondary claim will be heard.  
 Furthermore, proceeding in Member State A will not injure the defendant’s individual 
participatory rights because the claims in the secondary suit are identical or functionally 
                                                          
95 The one exception would be when settlement discussions are near to completion, since “defendants 
in a settlement posture routinely prefer a class definition that is as broad as possible in order to 
maximize the preclusive effects of the desired deal.” Nagareda (n 36) 11-12. 
96 See ibid 2. 
97 See Strong (n 83) ¶6.27. 
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identical to those in the first suit.98 While the decision is ultimately the defendant’s to make 
(since the claimant will not make the application to decline jurisdiction and the court is 
without the power to make such an order sua sponte), the defendant should prefer to proceed 
in a single forum in this particular scenario, given that other (i.e., non-rights-based) factors 
such as savings of transaction costs and the avoidance of irreconcilable judgments bode in 
favour of consolidation of the secondary claims with the collective claims. 
The situation looks very different from the claimant’s perspective. The claimant 
obviously wants to proceed in Member State B, since he or she has brought the action there. 
If the claimant’s individual participatory rights are to be given full effect, then the claimant 
has the right to choose the time, place and (perhaps) manner of asserting a claim as a matter 
of fundamental or constitutional law. Allowing the court in Member State B to decline 
jurisdiction would eviscerate all of those rights, at least on first glance.  
However, declining jurisdiction may not be as problematic as it appears if the various 
elements are unbundled and considered separately. For example, in this scenario, the claimant 
has clearly decided to bring suit now, so the question of whether and when to assert this 
particular claim is moot.  
Furthermore, parties do not appear to have an absolute right to assert a claim in a 
particular venue. For example, James Fawcett has suggested that ‘[w]hat Article 6 [of the 
ECHR] requires is that there is a trial somewhere and that this is before a tribunal in 
accordance with the requirements of Article 6. It does not matter that this trial is abroad’.99 
This principle is also reflected in the terms of Article 28 of the Brussels I Regulation itself, in 
that a court faced with a related action in a ‘normal’ dispute (i.e., a bilateral or traditional 
                                                          
98 See Fiss (n 19) 978 (‘We may value individual participation in structural litigation, but only to serve 
instrumental rather than dignitary ends: to insure that all interests are accounted for and that the 
strongest arguments are made on their behalf.’). 
99 Fawcett (n 18) 9 (discussing OT Africa Line Ltd v Hijazy (The Kribi) [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 76 
(Aikens, J), which states that ‘art. 6 of the ECHR does not provide that a person is to have an 
unfettered choice of tribunal in which to pursue or defend his civil rights’). 
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multilateral matter) may decline jurisdiction so as to allow the proceeding to go forward in 
another court on the application of only one of the parties. 
That leaves only the right (if indeed it is a ‘right’, as opposed to an interest) to 
proceed in the manner in which the claimant chooses. Certainly the European Parliament 
believes this to be an important concern, since the ability to proceed individually is expressly 
protected in the Resolution.100 However, the question is whether the courts (which are 
sometimes seen as prioritizing the Brussels I framework over fundamental rights) would take 
the same view.101  
The issue will likely turn on what is entailed by the right itself. Numerous possibilities 
exist. For example, the right to proceed individually could be seen as constituting (1) the right 
to make strategic decisions regarding the suit, including but not limited to the right to decide 
whether and when to accept a settlement; (2) the right to have counsel of one’s choice; (3) the 
right to have one’s ‘day in court’ (i.e., to be called to present evidence and tell one’s side of 
the story); (4) the right to seek individualized damages;102 (5) the right to more speedy 
resolution of the dispute than might be possible with a collective proceeding; and/or (6) the 
right to be at risk only for one’s own litigation costs.103 When considering the merits and 
relative weight of each of these interests, it is useful to see whether any concerns are satisfied 
by proceeding jointly with the collective claim. For example, the right to make strategic 
decisions regarding the suit might be considered less important if the facts and legal theories 
in the two cases are indeed identical, but the right to decide whether to settle the matter may 
                                                          
100 See Resolution (n 4) ¶27; see also Draft Recommendation (n 9) ¶22. 
101 Some commentators suggest that European authorities, including the European Court of Justice, 
are more concerned about upholding the Brussels I regime than about protecting human rights, 
including procedural rights of a constitutional and fundamental nature. See Fawcett (n 18) 16, 27 
(citing Maronier v Larmer [2002] EWCA Civ 774, [2003] QB 620). 
102 Evidence from the United States suggests that cases that proceed separately result in higher 
individual damages awards than cases that proceed collectively. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, 
AT&T Mobility LLC v Concepcion, 130 SCt 3322 (2010) (No 09-893), at 12. 
103 See Fiss (n 19) 967; Fiss (n 19) 25; Le Sueur (n 18) 457 (parsing out constituent elements of the 
right to access to justice). 
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continue to be important and could be violated in systems that allow a collective dispute to be 
settled without an individual claimant’s consent or ability to opt out of the settlement. 
Considering all of these possibilities in detail is beyond the scope of this article. 
However, should the court in Member State B decide that the right to proceed in the manner 
of one’s choosing constitutes a protectable right, then it will likely not decline jurisdiction. 
Instead, the court will likely stay proceedings under Article 28(1) of the Brussels I 
Regulation. However, that approach has its own difficulties, as discussed below.104 
 
(b) Claimant’s claim is different than that asserted in the collective suit 
Although it is possible that the secondary suit is identical to the first, it is also possible that 
the claims brought in Member State B differ in some critical regard from the claims brought 
in Member State A. The differences could relate to the kind or quantum of damages claimed, 
as in cases involving personal injury,105 or could arise as a result of various defences, as in 
cases involving competition law claims, where a defendant may argue that certain claimants 
are situated differently than others based on the extent to which the injury associated with the 
alleged anticompetitive behaviour has been passed on to consumers.  
This scenario, of course, gives rise to core concerns relating to the right to assert an 
individualized defence. In this situation, a defendant will likely not want to ask the secondary 
court to decline jurisdiction, since the suits are sufficiently different from the defendant’s 
perspective as to warrant separate proceedings. However, the defendant also needs to be 
cautious about seeking a stay under Article 28(1) of the Brussels I Regulation, since 
admitting that the cases are related could open a defendant up to later allegations that the 
judgment from the collective suit should have preclusive value in the individual action, as 
                                                          
104 See infra nn 109-48 and accompanying text. 
105 The Resolution contemplates the possibility that claimants can bring compensatory damages 
claims in cross-border collective proceedings. See Resolution (n 4) ¶20.  
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discussed further below.106 This possibility is based on language in Article 28(3) noting that 
the actions are related when there is a ‘risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from 
separate proceedings’. This provision suggests that stays under Article 28 are only 
appropriate because the Brussels I Regulation intends the court in the second proceeding to 
give some sort of preclusive effect to the judgment arising from the first proceeding.107 
Therefore, it is probably best from the defendant’s point of view to allow an 
individual claim, brought simultaneously, to proceed in parallel with a collective suit, at least 
in situations where the individual suit is sufficiently different from the collective suit that a 
defendant would want to assert the right to an individualized defence. While this will place 
some burden on the defendant, in that the defendant will have to proceed in two courts 
simultaneously, it may be superior to the costs and risks that could otherwise arise. Certainly 
the claimant should not object to this course of action, since it has brought the independent 
suit, and thus is in a position to have its individual participatory rights fulfilled. Although 
there may be a state or institutional (i.e., European Union) interest in efficiency and 
preservation of resources in having the claims heard in one forum (even if those claims are 
not precisely the same), the court has no apparent power under the Brussels I Regulation to 
raise the issue of related actions sua sponte and the powers identified in Article 28 are 
‘permissive, not compulsory’.108 
 
3. Subsequent Actions  
Although some claimants may bring a secondary suit while the collective claim is pending, 
other people will not bring an action until after a judgment has been rendered in the first suit. 
The types of issues that arise in this scenario are similar to cases where a secondary suit has 
                                                          
106 See infra n 130 and accompanying text. 
107 See Briggs and Rees (n 31) ¶2.245. 
108 Ibid ¶2.241; see also Stefanelli (n 12) 149. 
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been stayed pursuant to Article 28(1) of the Brussels I Regulation, so this discussion should 
be considered to apply equally to that scenario.109  
The difficulty here involves the concept of preclusion, a subject that is not addressed 
in the Brussels I Regulation. Instead, the Regulation speaks only of recognition and 
enforcement. As a result, significant questions arise as to the effect a collective judgment 
rendered in Member State A will have on a claim in Member State B arising out of the same 
factual scenario.110  
The first issue to address involves the law that governs issues of preclusion. Given the 
silence of the Brussels I Regulation in this regard, commentators have suggested that courts 
can and should turn to domestic law.111 The problem is that national law varies significantly 
regarding the scope of preclusion in both bilateral and multilateral disputes.112 For example, 
Rhonda Wasserman, analyzing data from a study conducted by the British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law (BIICL), found that:  
[i]n . . . England and Wales, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United States . . . 
judgments have issue preclusive effect. In . . . other countries, however – 
Germany, France, Romania, Sweden, and Switzerland – judgments have no 
issue preclusive effect. When coupled with the narrow definition of the claim 
for purposes of claim preclusion employed in these countries and the failure to 
accord settlements claim preclusive effect, this lack of issue preclusive effect 
may leave parties with a fair bit of room to relitigate matters already 
adjudicated [in a previous collective suit] by changing the theory upon which 
they sue or by seeking different relief.113 
 
According to Wasserman, the key issue is:  
the willingness (or not) of . . . European countries to bind persons who were 
not formally named as parties to the prior litigation. . . . European countries 
uniformly limit the claim preclusive effect of a judgment to the parties to the 
proceedings, but not all of them define the ‘parties to the proceedings’ 
identically. All of the . . . European countries [participating in the BIICL 
study] bind persons named as parties to the first action and their legal 
                                                          
109 See supra n 104 and accompanying text. 
110 See Barnett (n 22) 945.  
111 See ibid 956. 
112 See ibid 953-57; Hensler (n 1) 20-21; R Wasserman, ‘Transnational Class Actions and 
Interjurisdictional Preclusion’ (2011) 86 Notre Dame L Rev 313, 344-45.  
113 Wasserman (n 112) 344-45 (citations omitted); see also Barnett (n 22) 953-57.  
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successors. Some countries also bind absentees if their interests were 
represented in the action. The BIICL Report notes that ‘[t]his may occur in the 
context of group and representative actions’. 114 
 
The situation is exacerbated by the fact that ‘foreign laws authorizing group litigation 
are in an enormous state of flux right now’, which means that ‘foreign courts may hesitate 
before concluding that a class action and a follow-up action by an individual absent class 
member against the same defendant involve the “same parties” for purposes of claim 
preclusion’.115 
Wasserman identified several issues that may be important to questions relating to the 
enforcement of cross-border collective judgments arising in the inter- or intra-European 
context, including (1) differences in national laws regarding the various types of 
preclusion,116 (2) differences in collective procedures117 and (3) differences in the types of 
claims or legal theories that are asserted in the two actions.118 Notably, the European 
Parliament only appears to contemplate the need to address one of these issues (differences in 
collective procedures) in future legislation concerning large-scale litigation.119 However, 
Wasserman’s analysis suggests that the other two issues need to be addressed as well if the 
European Union is to establish a coherent system of cross-border collective redress.  
Indeed, as the following scenarios show, the current approach experiences significant 
problems under the Brussels I Regulation. The analysis can be broken down into two separate 
categories of cases, one where the defendant loses the collective action and one where the 
defendant prevails.120 Each is considered separately below. 
  
                                                          
114 Wasserman (n 112) 345 (citations omitted).  
115 Ibid 380 (writing in the context of US global class actions). 
116 See Barnett (n 22) 944 (identifying three basic types of preclusion). 
117 A significant amount of variation currently exists within the European Union. See D Fairgrieve & 
G Howells, ‘Collective Redress Procedures:  European Debates’, in Fairgrieve & Lein (n 1) 15, 15-41 
(discussing various national procedures).  
118 Wasserman (n 112) 366-80. 
119 See Resolution (n 4) ¶¶15-28. 
120 See Aceves (n 68) 607-09. 
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(a) Defendant loses the collective action 
The first scenario involves situations where the defendant has lost the initial collective action. 
Of the two types of post-judgment actions, this may be the more likely to arise, since 
publicity surrounding the defendant’s loss may inspire claimants who did not participate in 
the first action to bring their own separate suits, either because they now believe the case is 
winnable or because they believe they can benefit from some sort of preclusion.121  
Very little attention seems to have been paid within Europe to the problem of 
subsequent actions, based perhaps on experiences in the United States, where subsequent 
cases appear to be brought only rarely by individuals who have opted out of a class action 
that has been brought to judgment.122 However, the infrequent nature of subsequent actions in 
the United States may not be a good predictor of what will happen in Europe, for several 
reasons. First, US class actions use opt-out procedures that tend to create larger initial groups 
than the kind of opt-in approach that is currently used in most European Member States and 
that is likely to be used in any pan-European system of collective redress.123 Second, the 
United States has adopted a number of practices relating to the settlement of class actions that 
minimize the likelihood or the availability of subsequent actions.124 Third, the United States 
does not typically use a loser-pays approach to costs, although there are occasional fee-
shifting provisions in US statutes providing for class relief.125  
This final factor is intriguing, since the loser-pays principle that is prevalent in 
European Member States may provide an incentive for individual claimants to adopt a ‘wait 
and see’ approach to resolving claims associated with a mass injury. While some arguments 
                                                          
121 There are three basic types of preclusion. See Barnett (n 22) 944. Any one of these three could be 
at issue in a case involving collective suits. 
122 See Willging et al (n 33) 79. The situation is different in cases involving settlement.  See Hensler (n 
1) 21 (noting ‘extensive litigation has followed the settlement of some class actions in the United 
States’).  
123 See Hensler (n 1) 15-16; see also Resolution (n 4) ¶¶20, 27.  
124 See Hensler (n 1) 21. 
125 See ibid 22-25. 
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could be made that collective suits are conducted in the public interest and therefore should 
be subject to less onerous fee-shifting provisions, the European Parliament has suggested that 
no radical changes to loser-pays principles will be made in cases involving collective 
redress.126 Applying this rule strictly could work to increase the incidence of secondary suits 
if individuals can bring a subsequent action in Member State B that allows them to reap the 
benefit of the collective suit through reliance on principles of preclusion. For example, if an 
individual claimant could use issue preclusion to establish some key fact or issue in the 
second suit, that might be seen as virtually assuring the claimant of a positive outcome at 
trial. The threat of preclusion could lead the defendant to settle all subsequently filed suits on 
the grounds that a negative judgment on the merits of those claims would be virtually 
assured, given the outcome of the earlier case, and early settlement avoids the imposition of 
attorneys’ fees and costs. This approach would essentially turn the first collective suit into a 
multijurisdictional test case, something the European Parliament cannot have intended in the 
Resolution. 
 This creates a further dilemma for the court facing the second suit. While use of some 
sort of preclusion might reduce litigation in one way (i.e., by encouraging settlement), it also 
would appear to increase the number of claims filed. Furthermore, some judges might believe 
it inequitable to allow individual claimants to opt out of the first action because of a concern 
about costs, only to allow those parties to obtain a risk-free benefit from the earlier litigation. 
Because these policy-based considerations suggest conflicting outcomes, a rights-
based analysis may prove more useful. This inquiry involves several steps. 
The first issue to address is whether a judgment of this nature would be subject to 
recognition and enforcement under the Brussels I Regulation. European preferences for opt-in 
                                                          
126 See Resolution (n 4) ¶20 (noting ‘there can be no action without financial risk’ and leaving issues 
relating to allocation of costs to individual Member States); Hensler (n 1) 22-25; TD Rowe, ‘Shift 
Happens: Pressure on Foreign-Attorney Fee Paradigms from Class Actions’ (2003) 13 Duke J Comp 
and Int’l L 124, 147. 
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procedures in cross-border collective disputes are intended to eliminate any possibility of a 
blanket objection to the enforcement of collective judgments under the public policy 
provision contained in Article 34(1) of the Brussels I Regulation.127 Reliance on opt-in 
procedures helps ensure the presumptive enforceability of collective judgments in inter-
European disputes.  
While this approach is beneficial in situations where the parties in the original suit 
want to enforce the judgment against each other, it is problematic when a claimant in a 
secondary suit wants to use some aspect of the first judgment for preclusive purposes. Indeed, 
a cursory reading of Articles 34 and 35 of the Brussels I Regulation suggests that defendants 
have no grounds for blocking enforcement or recognition of a collective judgment, at least as 
a blanket concern.128  
                                                          
127 See D Fairgrieve, ‘The Impact of the Brussels I Enforcement and Recognition Rules on Collective 
Actions’, in Fairgrieve & Lein (n 1), 171, 176-86. 
128 Article 34 states: 
A judgment shall not be recognised: 
1. if such recognition is manifestly contrary to public policy in the Member State in 
which recognition is sought; 
2. where it was given in default of appearance, if the defendant was not served with 
the document which instituted the proceedings or with an equivalent document in 
sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him to arrange for his defence, unless 
the defendant failed to commence proceedings to challenge the judgment when it was 
possible for him to do so; 
3. if it is irreconcilable with a judgment given in a dispute between the same parties in 
the Member State in which recognition is sought; 
4. if it is irreconcilable with an earlier judgment given in another Member State or in a 
third State involving the same cause of action and between the same parties, provided 
that the earlier judgment fulfils the conditions necessary for its recognition in the 
Member State addressed. 
 
Brussels I Regulation (n 9) art. 34.  Article 35 states: 
 
1. Moreover, a judgment shall not be recognised if it conflicts with Sections 3, 4 or 6 
of Chapter II, or in a case provided for in Article 72. 
2. In its examination of the grounds of jurisdiction referred to in the foregoing 
paragraph, the court or authority applied to shall be bound by the findings of fact on 
which the court of the Member State of origin based its jurisdiction. 
3. Subject to the paragraph 1, the jurisdiction of the court of the Member State of 
origin may not be reviewed. The test of public policy referred to in point 1 of Article 
34 may not be applied to the rules relating to jurisdiction. 
 
Ibid art. 35. 
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Courts considering whether to block recognition of the collective judgment in a 
subsequent individual action could follow one of several lines of analysis. First, a judge could 
determine that a claimant in a secondary suit is not an ‘interested party’ for purposes of 
Article 33(2) and thus cannot apply for the judgment to have preclusive effect in an ongoing 
dispute.129 However, this would not appear to be a proper reading of the Brussels I 
Regulation. The term ‘interested party’ obviously requires less of a connection to the initial 
suit than exists when ‘the same party’ is involved.130 One good analogy would be to consider 
an ‘interested party’ to be someone who is involved in a ‘related action’ under Article 28 of 
the Brussels I Regulation, as distinguished from someone who is ‘the same party’ under 
Article 27. Since this type of secondary suit would fall under Article 28 if it were brought 
simultaneously with the first proceeding, the claimant in a subsequently brought dispute 
should be considered an ‘interested party’ under Article 33(2). 
Second, a judge could conclude that recognizing the collective judgment in a 
subsequently brought secondary suit would constitute a violation of public policy under 
Article 34(1), since to do so would infringe upon the individual participatory rights of either 
the defendant or the claimant. For example, claimants have a strong (though not absolute) 
right to litigate their claims individually as a matter of national or European law.131 However, 
defendants also have a right to mount an individualized defence whenever the claims or 
defences lack the requisite commonality. A court might conclude that the claimant’s decision 
to proceed individually reflects a determination on the claimant’s part that there is some sort 
of individualized issue at stake that would make collective treatment improper. Because it 
                                                          
129 Article 33(2) states: 
 
Any interested party who raises the recognition of a judgment as the principal issue in 
a dispute may, in accordance with the procedures provided for in Sections 2 and 3 of 
this Chapter, apply for a decision that the judgment be recognised. 
 
Ibid art. 33(2). 
130 See Fairgrieve (n 127) 187-88; Stefanelli (n 12) 149-51. 
131 See Resolution (n 4) ¶27; Fairgrieve (n 127) 176-86. 
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would be inequitable to allow a claimant to take the view that the suit is individual in one 
regard but collective in another, and because the claimant’s and defendant’s individual 
participatory rights are of equal weight and point towards the same outcome (i.e., a 
determination based solely on the facts and claims established in the secondary action 
between the two parties to that action), the court would be justified in denying recognition of 
the collective judgment in the second proceeding.132  
This conclusion seems persuasive for several reasons. First, this analysis focuses on a 
rights-to-rights comparison, rather than a rights-to-interests inquiry, which is preferable as a 
matter of principle, given that legal rights ‘trump’ legal interests.133 Therefore, any state 
interest in efficiency (which would have to be on the regional level rather than the national 
level, since the secondary suit is being brought in a different Member State than the collective 
suit) should be set aside in order to prioritize the ability of an individual claimant to choose 
the time, place and manner of bringing a legal action. Furthermore, while the defendant may 
have a policy interest in collective suits based on efficiency, any arguments in that regard 
would lead to a negative outcome for the defendant (i.e., recognition of a losing judgment), 
so it is unlikely that such an issue will be raised.  
The above analysis relates to situations where the collective judgment has not yet 
been enforced or recognized in Member State B and the issue is raised for the first time by 
Person B in the secondary suit.134 However, a party to the first suit may have already obtained 
recognition and enforcement of the collective judgment in Member State B at the time the 
                                                          
132 This issue is analogous to the principle that parties are supposed to raise all related claims and 
issues at the time the initial litigation goes forward. See Barnett (n 22) 951-53, 956-57. Failure to do 
so in this circumstance would not preclude Person B from bringing a claim, but would preclude him 
or her from seeking to rely on it for purposes of issue preclusion. 
133 See Le Sueur (n 18) 469-74. 
134 See Brussels I Regulation (n 9) arts. 33, 38. 
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secondary suit is brought, thus shifting the inquiry to issues relating to the preclusive force of 
a judgment that has been recognized.135 
The defendant’s first inclination may be to argue that even though the judgment has 
been recognized, it has no effect on the litigation with Person B because the parties are not 
the same. This may be a difficult point to win, given the suggestion by some commentators 
that claim or issue preclusion can withstand a formal lack of identity in cases involving 
collective redress.136 While much of that analysis has been conducted in the context of opt-
out rather than opt-in actions, some judges might find the arguments persuasive, particularly 
if the focus is on policy rationales regarding the reduction of litigation.137 Furthermore, there 
is some European precedent, albeit in other contexts, that parties are regarded as identical 
where their interests are ‘identical to and indissociable from’ that of another party.138 
However, it has also been said that ‘[c]aution must be exercised before finding privity based 
on a community of interest’.139 
Therefore, the defendant may be better served by relying on a rights-based analysis 
grounded in the right to assert an individualized defence. This argument is based on the 
position that because there is no way to tell, in advance, whether the defendant will be able to 
rebut arguments and facts presented by this claimant and this claimant’s counsel, a court 
should not assume, a priori, that this claimant should prevail on certain issues or claims. This 
is essentially the same approach proposed as a means of avoiding recognition of the judgment 
under the public policy provisions contained in Article 33(1) of the Brussels I Regulation. 
However, because courts often construe public policy very narrowly in recognition 
                                                          
135 Notably, the question of preclusion also arises if Person B is able to argue successfully for 
recognition under Article 33(2) of the Brussels I Regulation. 
136 See Wasserman (n 112) 344-45, 380; see also Briggs and Rees (n 31) ¶2.245 (discussing The Tatry 
C-406/92, [1994] ECR I-5439); Stefanelli (n 12) 145-51 (same). 
137 See Wasserman (n 112) 344-45, 380; see also Briggs and Rees (n 31) ¶2.245. 
138 C-351/96 Drouot Assurances SA v Consolidated Metallurgical Industries (CMI Industrial Sites) 
[1998] ECR I-3075 ¶23; Briggs and Rees (n 31) ¶7.26. 
139 KR Handley, ‘Some Overlooked Aspects of the Res Judicata Doctrine’ (2011) 127 LQR 83, 95.  
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proceedings,140 the outcome might be different in this type of unrelated action. Nevertheless, 
the argument could prove persuasive as a means of avoiding preclusion.   
Another issue to consider is the possibility that the failure to give preclusive value to 
the collective judgment in the secondary proceeding might give rise to irreconcilable 
judgments. This issue is a major concern under the Brussels I Regulation, justifying both a 
stay of a related action under Article 28(1) and non-recognition of a judgment between the 
same parties under Articles 34(3) and 34(4).  
However, the concern about irreconcilable judgments should not in most 
circumstances allow a court in Member State B to give some sort of preclusionary effect to a 
collective judgment from Member State A in cases where the defendant has already lost the 
collective claim. This is because an inconsistent judgment (i.e., a judgment that the defendant 
is not liable in the second suit) will only work to the favour of the defendant, who is the only 
common party between the various cases.141 While this may be conceptually problematic, it is 
usually not practically problematic, since a determination that the defendant is not liable will 
usually not place the defendant in a situation where conflicting duties are imposed. While a 
different analysis might be necessary in cases where different (and conflicting) types of 
injunctive relief are sought, that will not usually be the case, since injunctive relief in the 
collective suit in Member State A would likely have already resolved the claims of Person 
B.142 Therefore, if monetary liability is the only inconsistency at stake, then courts should be 
willing to allow the possibility of different outcomes because it gives the parties the ability to 
exercise their individual participatory rights while working no particular hardship to the 
defendant, the only party in common.  
 
                                                          
140 See Danov (n 11) 39 (noting the public policy exception is used only rarely); Fairgrieve (n 127) 
176-86. 
141 See Fairgrieve (n 127) 187-88. 
142 See Briggs and Rees (n 31) ¶7.22 (discussing the meaning of irreconcilability). 
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(b) Defendant prevails in the collective action 
The second scenario to consider is when the defendant has prevailed in the collective suit and 
is seeking to use the judgment preclusively against a claimant in a second action in Member 
State B. This situation has been considered with some frequency in the context of discussions 
about opt-out procedures in the United States, although it is unclear whether and to what 
extent those analyses should be applicable in European cases involving parties who have 
declined to opt into a collective action.143 
Some of this commentary has suggested that the issue ought to turn on whether the 
facts, law or legal theories in the second action are the same as in the first.144 However, it is 
not clear whether that approach would sufficiently take into account European concerns that 
‘individual victims should remain free not to pursue the opt-in collective action but instead 
seek redress individually’.145 To some extent, the outcome of this determination may depend 
on how claimants’ individual participatory rights are defined and whether the ability to 
litigate a matter independently of the collective suit is reliant on the claims being somehow 
different than those asserted in the collective litigation.  
Interestingly, if a court were to conclude that individual participatory rights were 
contingent on the secondary claims being different in nature from those asserted in the 
collective litigation, that might be construed as turning what is currently considered to be a 
procedural right into a substantive one.146 This would be problematic if the right to proceed 
independently is defined in inter-European disputes to be procedural in nature.147  
Thus, allowing preclusion in situations where the secondary suit is not substantively 
different from the collective suit appears to pass muster from the claimants’ perspective. 
                                                          
143 See Wasserman (n 112) 344-45, 380; Bronsteen and Fiss (n 34) 1433. 
144 See Wasserman (n 112) 344-45, 380; Bronsteen and Fiss (n 34) 1433. 
145 Resolution (n 4) ¶27. 
146 See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc, PA v Allstate Ins Co, 130 SCt 1431, 1442-48 (2010); 
Amchem Products, Inc v Windsor, 521 US 591, 613 (1997); Bisaillon v Concordia University [2006] 
1 SCR 666, 2006 SCC 19, ¶¶15, 17 (construing legislation from Quebec); Strong (n 78) 965-75.  
147 See Resolution (n 4) ¶15. 
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However, the analysis is not complete. The defendants’ individual participatory rights must 
also be considered. 
 At first, the scales might seem to tip in favour of preclusion in secondary suits 
involving identical claims. For example, a denial of preclusion would appear to violate the 
defendant’s right to rely on previously rendered judgments (i.e., establish the res judicata 
value of the award) as well as the defendant’s policy-based interest in efficiency (in that the 
defendant would prefer to avoid incurring the cost of defending a second suit in what is 
essentially the same cause of action).  
However, defendants’ individual participatory rights are not limited to principles of 
preclusion. Defendants also claim the right to assert an individualized defence. Although this 
right could be seen as the mirror image of claimants’ right to assert an individualized claim, 
the two actually exist in parallel. 
In this case, the claimant has brought his or her claim too late for it to be joined with 
the collective suit. Furthermore, the claimant is bringing the claim in light of the knowledge 
that the defendant has prevailed on the first claim. This gives rise to two possibilities. First, 
the claimant could bring an action that is identical to the first. While this is theoretically 
possible, it is unlikely, since the claimant knows that the defendant will likely prevail (as in 
the first case) even without the application of preclusionary principles. Second, the claimant 
could bring an action that is in some way different than the first suit. This procedural posture 
augurs against preclusion, both as a matter of individual participatory rights and res judicata 
concerns. Therefore, preclusion in cases where a defendant has prevailed in the first suit 





Traditionally, most litigation has proceeded on a bilateral basis.148 However, a growing 
number of disputes both within and between European Member States involve mass 
claims.149 Indeed, in 2008, ten percent of the collective redress cases involving the then-
thirteen Member States with collective redress mechanisms was estimated to be cross-border 
in nature, with the number rising to as high as forty percent if collective injuries in Member 
States without domestic forms of collective redress were included.150 These figures, which 
are already significant, will undoubtedly rise in the coming years as the forces of 
globalization and European integration increase the amount of trade that is conducted 
between European Member States.151  
The increasing volume of cross-border collective injuries was one reason behind 
European authorities’ decision to consider the possibility of a coherent plan to cross-border 
collective redress.152 However, European policymakers were also concerned about the 
effectiveness of existing mechanisms providing for collective redress.153 Although creation of 
a dedicated procedure to deal with large-scale litigation involving parties in different Member 
States may resolve some of these issues, significant problems remain with respect to 
jurisdiction and enforcement under the Brussels I Regulation in its current or forthcoming 
form.154 Although there is much work to be done in this regard,155 two issues stand out as 
needing immediate attention.  
First, legislators and policymakers need to determine whether individuals who choose 
not to join a collective suit only retain the right to proceed individually or whether such 
                                                          
148 See Hess (n 11) 116. 
149 See Directorate General for Internal Policies (n 3) 38; Hensler (n 1) 7; Watt (n 11) 111. 
150 See Directorate General for Internal Policies (n 3) 43; Green Paper, Consumer Collective Redress, 
COM(2008)794 ¶15 (27 November 2008).   
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Legal Order’, in S Muller et al (eds), 1 The Law of the Future and the Future of the Law 249, 250-59 
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152 See Resolution (n 4) ¶¶D, H; see also Public Consultation (n 6).  
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154 See supra n 9. 
155 A recent collection of essays addresses a number of these matters.  See Fairgrieve & Lein (n 1). 
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persons may also bring a second large-scale action.156 This question is sure to arise, and 
legislative guidance is necessary to ensure predictability and consistency among the various 
national courts.   
Second, legislators and policymakers must also determine how non-participants in a 
collective suit are to be considered under the Brussels I Regulation, i.e., whether they the 
‘same parties’, ‘interested parties’ or something else. This issue is central to a number of 
different analyses under the Brussels I Regulation, including those regarding both jurisdiction 
and enforcement, and it is important for courts to adopt a single, standard approach to this 
matter so as to avoid confusion.  
Once those matters are decided, European policymakers will have to consider whether 
it is feasible to amend the Brussels I Regulation yet again to take collective redress into 
account or whether it is better to include the necessary procedural rules in any new form of 
cross-border collective redress that is eventually developed.  Given the complexities of the 
issues involved, the latter seems the preferred course of action.  However, in so doing, 
European and national authorities must take the various elements of both claimants’ and 
defendants’ individual participatory rights into account. While rights-based analyses can be 
complicated at times, they can provide useful answers to difficult questions and can 
overcome many of the impasses that arise under policy-drive inquiries, as this article has 
shown. 
As important as individual participatory rights are, they are not the only interests at 
stake. For example, commentators have suggested that issues relating to collective redress 
should not be analyzed on a purely individualistic level, since large-scale disputes can affect 
matters of regulatory concern.157 Although litigation may not initially appear to be capable of 
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157 See Strong (n 5); Watt (n 11) 111-15; Watt (n 1) 120, 124-27. 
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reflecting a regulatory purpose or effect, the issue has received consideration attention from 
commentators in both the domestic and transnational realm.158 
Another important consideration involves the way in which European procedures will 
interact with similar mechanisms used outside the European Union. Numerous commentators 
have remarked upon the difficulties associated with large-scale international litigation 
involving European and non-European nations, and the adoption of a new form of collective 
redress in Europe will only increase the analytical complexities involved in these sorts of 
suits.159  This is particularly true given the expanded extraterritorial effect of the Brussels I 
Regulation under the recast regulation.160 
Collective redress has acquired a considerable amount of “urgency in a short space of 
time,” putting significant pressure on governments to devise adequate procedural 
mechanisms.161 Although the current analysis has taken place in the context of European 
procedural law, many of the issues discussed herein can and will arise in large-scale litigation 
in other jurisdictions, including global class actions seated in the United States.  In 
considering these matters, it is important to understand what precisely is involved so as to 
ensure a process that guarantees procedural fairness to all parties.  Indeed, only by 
                                                          
158 See F Bignami, ‘Cooperative Legalism and the Non-Americanization of European Regulatory 
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in Public Law’ (2012) 53 Wm and Mary L Rev 1137, 1140; RD Kelemen, ‘Suing for Europe:  
Adversarial Legalism and European Governance’ (2006) 39 Comp Pol Stud 101, 102; P Luff, ‘Risk 
Regulation and Regulatory Litigation’ (2011) 64 Rutgers L Rev 73, 96, 113-14; Nagareda (n 36) 13; 
Strong (n 5). 
159 See Bermann (n 23) 94; Buxbaum, Securities (n 158) 35; Buxbaum, Transnational (n 158) 251; SJ 
Choi and LJ Silberman, ‘Transnational Litigation and Global Securities Class Actions’ (2009) 
Wisconsin L Rev 465; Dixon (n 36) 134; Monestier (n 36) 44-45; Mulheron, Opt-Out (n 36) 426-27; 
Mulheron, Vivendi (n 36) 181-82; Nagareda (n 36) 11-12; LS Simard and J Tidmarsh, ‘Foreign 
Citizens in Transnational Class Actions’ (2011) 97 Cornell L Rev 87, 89; M Stiggelbout, ‘The 
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160 See Brussels I Recast (n 9); Press Release (n 15); see also supra n 15 and accompanying text. 
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unbundling the constituent elements of the various participatory rights can the issues at stake 
truly be understood, weighed and protected.   
 
